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INTRODUCTION 
Following the boom in subprime and high-risk lending from 2002 to 
2006—after an earlier escalation in the late 1990s—loan defaults and fore-
closures surged in many parts of the country in 2006 and 2007.1  As the 
subprime debacle evolved into a broader mortgage crisis, which later cata-
lyzed national and global economic decline, the costs of failing to regulate 
a new, high-risk mortgage market—revolutionized by private-label securi-
tization—became painfully obvious.  By early 2008, the mortgage crisis 
had led to direct losses to investors in mortgage-backed securities in the 
$350 to $420 billion range, but because these losses occured at leveraged 
financial institutions, their full impact was estimated to be $2 trillion or 
more.2  By August of 2008, write-downs and losses of mortgage-backed 
securities by commercial and investment banks had climbed to over $500 
billion, and were projected to end up at somewhere on the order of $1 tril-
lion or more, even before accounting for leveraged impacts, and some were 
predicting that total write-downs and losses would reach well beyond these 
levels.3  The impacts on financial institutions were further magnified by the 
use of credit default swaps and other derivative instruments. 
By the fall of 2008, the problems of credit and financial markets had 
grown so large that they had brought down a number of major financial 
firms, including Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, and AIG, and 
compelled the government takeover of the government sponsored enter-
prises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Even more broadly, the financial cri-
sis had spread to commercial paper markets and inter-bank lending, slow-
ing credit flows in these markets and affecting a much broader segment of 
the real economy.  These developments led the Treasury Department, to-
gether with the Federal Reserve Board, to push for a major federal program 
to purchase distressed mortgage-backed and related securities from finan-
cial institutions.4  After some substantial fits and starts, the Emergency 
 
 1. Based on Mortgage Bankers Association data, the number of loans entering foreclo-
sure in the fourth quarter of 2007 topped 400,000, up from under 200,000 per quarter as re-
cently as 2005 and under 100,000 as recently as 1999.  See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV., STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2008), 
available at  http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2008/son2008_executive 
_summary.pdf. 
 2. See ADRIAN BLUNDELL-WIGNALL, THE SUBPRIME CRISIS:  SIZE, DELEVERAGING AND 
SOME POLICY OPTIONS 10 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/27/ 
40451721.pdf. 
 3. See Yalman Onaran, Banks Subprime Losses Top $500 Billion on Writedowns,  
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid= 
a8sW0n1Cs1tY&refer=home. 
 4. See Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
2, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02crisis.html. 
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Economic Stabilization Act was passed which provided for a $700 billion 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”), which provided the ability to 
buy mortgage-backed securities and to invest in equity shares of financial 
institutions.5 
As the country’s attention moved from a severe, but narrower, subprime 
mortgage crisis to a much broader national and global economic crisis, less 
notice was given to the costs of the heavy and concentrated foreclosures 
caused by subprime lending.  Borrowers lost their homes and saw their 
credit records decimated.  Many renters—who clearly had no role in the 
mortgage process—found themselves with little notice to vacate their 
homes.  Neighborhoods around the country were littered with vacant and 
abandoned properties, which can depress the values of nearby homes and 
create havens for blight and crime.6  The problems were not just confined 
to the inner-city.  In some places, entire suburban or exurban subdivisions 
that had been planned or started at the peak of the high-risk lending boom 
in the mid-2000s were left half-empty or worse.  Cities and suburbs were 
forced to become custodians of abandoned properties in order to slow the 
contagion effects of derelict properties.7 
This Article describes the development of mortgage markets in the 
United States during the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on the 
growth of high-risk market segments beginning in the 1990s.  Part I pro-
vides a brief look at the history of institutional mortgage markets in the 
United States, with particular focus on the federal role in the development 
of stable, risk-limiting products and markets.  Part II turns to the growth of 
securitization.  It then discusses structured finance and its impacts on mort-
gage markets, again with specific attention to the role of federal policy in 
nurturing these systems.  Finally, Part III discusses the policy debates and 
developments surrounding subprime and other high-risk mortgage lending 
from the 1990s through the 2007–2008 mortgage crisis. 
 
 5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital 
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/hp1207.htm. 
 6. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED:  HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND 
THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 149-53 (2009) [hereinafter IMMER-
GLUCK, FORECLOSED]. 
 7. See Daniel Immergluck, Community Response to the Foreclosure Crisis:  Thoughts 
on Local Interventions 11-17 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Discussion Paper No. 01-08, 
2008), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/dp_0108.pdf. 
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I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF RISK-LIMITING MORTGAGE MARKETS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
The structure of homeownership finance played a key role in the rela-
tively limited extent of homeownership in the United States through the 
early decades of the twentieth century.  Prior to the late nineteenth century, 
institutional lending for homeownership was relatively rare, although early 
forms generally date back to the first terminating building society in 1831.8  
For the nonaffluent, owner occupancy was usually achieved during this 
pre-institutional period through some combination of doing one’s own con-
struction, extensive household savings, borrowing from individuals, and 
land contract financing.9 
It is no coincidence that institutional lending in the United States and in 
England grew substantially with the Second Industrial Revolution and large 
scale urbanization in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth cen-
tury.  Rural homesteaders faced fewer obstacles to homebuilding and own-
ership than urban households.  Land was relatively inexpensive and materi-
als could generally be harvested off the land.  As cities grew and land 
values rose, however, working class and modest-income families could 
rarely afford to buy land and build a house without some sort of financing 
over time.10 
The rise of stable, risk-limiting mortgage finance markets in the broad 
middle part of the twentieth century—epitomized by the long-term domi-
nance of the plain-vanilla thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage—was dependent 
on a persistent and substantive role for the federal government.  The time-
line of U.S. mortgage market development and change is not one of bright 
lines and clear boundaries, although there were certainly periods during 
which change occurred quite rapidly.  Rather, different outside forces—
including those based in technology, policy, and demography—interacted 
with each other to produce new financial products and practices, changes in 
the structure of the financial services industry, and various opportunities 
and vulnerabilities among homeowners and would-be homeowners in dif-
ferent parts of the country. 
 
 8. See DAVID MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS:  A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831–1995, at 17-18 (2004). 
 9. Land contract financing involves a “buyer” agreeing to make monthly payments (on 
top of what is usually a substantial up front deposit) over a fixed period for occupancy with 
some notion that, possibly after repeated contract renewals, the buyer will assume owner-
ship.  They resemble rent-to-own arrangements.  See Marc A. Weiss, Marketing and Fi-
nancing Home Ownership:  Mortgage Lending and Public Policy in the United States, 
1918-1989, 18 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 110 (1989). 
 10. Id. at 110-11. 
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A. The Local Building and Loan 
From the early decades of the twentieth century through at least the 
1970s, it is arguable that no single type of lender was more important to the 
development of government-supervised, risk-limiting mortgage markets 
than the building and loan (“B&L”), later called the savings and loan 
(“S&L”).  The B&L became a major provider of mortgage credit, and be-
cause of its direct and indirect impacts on the structure of home finance and 
the mortgage market itself.  Traditional, permanent B&Ls developed into a 
significant industry in the later decades of the nineteenth century.11  Early 
B&Ls were primarily local institutions, with many members knowing each 
other or having some common association.  Social and geographic cohe-
siveness gave them an informational advantage that kept underwriting costs 
and defaults low.  B&L members/borrowers depended on the solvency and 
profitability of the B&L, and the fate of the B&L rested closely with the 
success of borrowers.12 
Besides B&Ls, life insurance and mortgage companies were important 
providers of mortgages in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
centuries.13  Mortgage companies made loans and then sold either individ-
ual loans (what would now be called “whole loan” sales) or bonds backed 
by the loans to investors.  The bonds sold by mortgage companies, how-
ever, were not like the mortgage-backed securities that became so common 
in the late twentieth century.  These bonds more closely resembled corpo-
rate bonds because they remained general obligations of the originating 
mortgage company, and the underlying mortgages remained on the books 
of the mortgage company.14 
Local B&Ls grew significantly in the early twentieth century—
supported to some degree by state-level regulation that had begun in the 
late nineteenth century—and maintained their emphasis on homeownership 
 
 11. The early B&Ls, which date to well before the Civil War, were actually local “ter-
minating building societies.”  Those joining a terminating B&L would make regular pay-
ments on shares they purchased in the B&L as a form of savings.  Once enough capital was 
accumulated in the B&L to build or purchase a house, the capital was auctioned off to the 
member willing to pay the highest interest.  Once everyone had paid for their loans in full, 
the organization closed its doors.  See MASON, supra note 8, at 18. 
 12. Michael J. Lea, Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit:  A Historical Perspec-
tive, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 147, 154-55 (1996), available at http://www.mi.vt.edu/data/ 
files/hpd%207(1)/hpd%207(1)%20lea.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 156-59. 
 14. See D. M. Fredericksen, Mortgage Banking in America, 2 J. POL. ECON. 203, 210-15 
(1984); see also KENNETH A. SNOWDEN, MORTGAGE COMPANIES AND MORTGAGE SECURITI-
ZATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 11-12 (2008), available at http://www.uncg.edu/ 
bae/people/snowden/Wat_jmcb_aug07.pdf. 
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finance.15  After the Panic of 1907 and through the boom period of the 
early 1920s, the number of local B&Ls grew, buttressed by the social and 
cultural mores that favored homeownership and by the general growth in 
real estate and the economy.16  With the real estate collapse of the late 
1920s and the onset of the Great Depression, the number of B&Ls de-
clined, but at the beginning of the Great Depression, B&Ls made about 
one-fifth of home mortgages in the United States.17  Moreover, commercial 
banks tended to fare even worse than B&Ls in the early 1930s, in part be-
cause bank depositors could withdraw their funds more quickly than those 
who held B&L shares, which exacerbated bank runs and failures. 
There were significant differences in the structure and nature of credit 
provided by various types of lenders.  B&Ls provided longer-term loans 
with higher loan-to-value ratios (but still rarely ever exceeding 80%) than 
banks or insurance companies.18  In the 1920s, the average term of mort-
gages was eleven years for those written by B&Ls, versus six to eight for 
those from insurance companies and two to three for those from commer-
cial banks.19  Average loan-to-value ratios were 60% for B&Ls and 50% 
for those from other lenders.20  The shorter term, interest-only loans with 
relatively low loan-to-value ratios made by banks and insurance companies 
were known as “straight” mortgages.  Homeowners with these loans had to 
take out new loans much more frequently, and so would incur the up-front 
costs associated with more frequent borrowing.  The limited loan-to-value 
ratios of these loans typically required the involvement of a substantial sec-
ond mortgage which came with very high fees and interest rates.  They 
 
 15. See MASON, supra note 8, at 28-29, 37-39. 
 16. Id. at 53-54, 59-60. 
 17. Id. at 60. 
 18. Loan-to-value ratios are important in underwriting loans for lenders and borrowers 
for several reasons.  From the lender’s perspective, a lower loan-to-appraised value means 
that, in case of foreclosure, the lender is more likely to recover the full value of the principal 
lent, especially in the event of falling property values.  A lower loan-to-value also tends to 
be associated with a larger down-payment, which means that the borrower has put more of 
his or her own money into the property.  From the borrower’s perspective, lower loan-to-
value ratios can protect them in the case of falling property values by allowing them to refi-
nance or sell the home without an out-of-pocket loss.  Lower loan-to-values may, however, 
also make it more difficult for the borrower to afford the down-payment on a home.  One 
alternative is to secure a second, subordinate loan to supplement the primary, first mortgage.  
Private mortgage insurance was developed to allow lenders to provide higher loan-to-value 
ratios (larger first loans) to reduce down payment requirements. 
 19. See Lea, supra note 12, at 162. 
 20. See id. 
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were typically offered by marginal participants in the financial industry and 
were often unregulated and operated in violation of state usury laws.21 
B. The 1930s:  Federal Leadership in Home Finance 
By the early 1920s, the federal government had become a supporting—
and sometimes catalyzing or initiating—actor in the promotion of home-
ownership in the United States.22  It was not until the 1930s, however, that 
Congress and the executive branch became key participants in the devel-
opment, expansion, and direction of homeownership and mortgage finance.  
Before the 1930s, many Americans, even many with decent incomes, found 
it very hard to borrow sufficient funds to purchase a home.  The homeown-
ership rate at the turn of the century was just above 46% and, despite the 
very large economic expansion of the 1920s, it had climbed to only just 
under 48% by 1930.23  Up until 1940, the U.S. homeownership rate re-
mained relatively low compared to post-World War II levels. 
Initial federal involvement in the mortgage market is often attributed to 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal.  To be sure, the 1934 National Housing 
Act,24 which created the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), was 
one of the most important pieces of housing legislation in the twentieth 
century.  It followed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, however, 
which President Hoover proposed and signed.25  This bill created the Home 
Loan Bank system to provide liquidity to savings and loans to increase 
 
 21. HOME FINANCE AND TAXATION:  LOANS, ASSESSMENTS, AND TAXES ON RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY 28 (John M. Gries & James Ford eds., 1932). 
 22. See Lawrence J. Vale, The Ideological Origins of Affordable Homeownership Ef-
forts, in CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM:  NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOMEOWN-
ERSHIP 19-24 (W. Rohe & H. Watson eds., 2007). 
 23. When compared to some other countries, the U.S. rate was not particularly low, but 
this was partly attributable to the relatively rural nature of the U.S. at the time and to the de-
sire of recent immigrants to own their own home.  See Richard Harris & Chris Hamnett, The 
Myth of the Promised Land:  The Social Diffusion of Home Ownership in Britain and North 
America, 77 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 173-90 (1987).  Reliable data on homeown-
ership rates between decennial censuses at the national level are not available for the 1920s.  
The real estate sector had slowed down in the late 1920s prior to the stock market crash of 
late 1929.  See Ernest Fisher, Changing Institutional Patterns of Mortgage Lending, 5 J. FIN. 
307-10 (1950).  Therefore, it is very likely that the homeownership rate in the 1920s peaked 
before 1930.  It is unlikely, however, that it hit rates substantially above 50% given the sub-
stantial barriers to ownership. 
 24. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1749 (2006)). 
 25. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (2006)); see also SUSAN HOFFMAN, POLITICS AND BANKING:  IDEAS, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 160-61 (2001). 
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their role in the mortgage market.26  Hoover and others saw the longer-
term, higher loan-to-value amortizing mortgage provided by savings and 
loans as a key tool in promoting homeownership and stimulating the hous-
ing market.27  The law gave the federal government a significant role in 
promoting and standardizing the mortgage market.  Government not only 
authorized, but also invested in, the creation of the new secondary market 
institutions by initially capitalizing the Home Loan Banks.  Member insti-
tutions were required to purchase small amounts of stock to become the 
owners of the Banks over time. 
The Home Loan Bank system fostered a new standardization and federal 
endorsement of the B&L-type loan.  It was also the first direct government 
vehicle for dealing with the long-term/short-term liquidity mismatch that 
faced B&Ls with short-term deposits.  By allowing banks to “rediscount” 
their mortgage assets, the government was creating liquidity, thereby 
stimulating the mortgage and housing market.  B&Ls were generally local 
institutions, so imbalances could arise in terms of supply and demand for 
credit in different parts of the country.  The Home Loan Bank system also 
provided for geographic redistribution of lending capital.  Some older, de-
veloped areas had a surplus supply of lending capital, while other growing 
areas had surplus demand for mortgages.  The Home Loan Bank system 
provided a system of “banks for banks,” in which thrifts could lend and 
borrow through the regional Home Loan Bank, which in turn could ex-
change funds throughout the system.  This redistributed funds throughout 
the nation in a more efficient manner. 
Like most government policy regarding financial markets, the Home 
Loan Bank Act was contested.  Insurance companies and mortgage compa-
nies who viewed B&Ls as competition and did not provide the B&L form 
of loan argued against the bill at that time.  They claimed that the Home 
Loan Banks were unnecessary and encouraged unsound lending with 
overly long maturities and excessive loan-to-value ratios.  They argued that 
the non-amortizing straight mortgage—essentially a short-term (three to 
seven years), interest-only loan—was proper finance.  By encouraging 
longer-term mortgages, opponents argued, the Home Loan Banks would 
encourage precisely the sort of overbuilding that helped cause the Depres-
sion in the first place.28 
Roosevelt pushed for more aggressive interventions in the housing mar-
ket.  The Home Loan Banks did little in the near term for homeowners who 
 
 26. See HOFFMAN, supra note 25. 
 27. Id. at 160. 
 28. See id. at 167. 
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were losing their homes through foreclosures.  Moreover, because they 
were wholesale institutions, the Banks were perceived as benefiting only 
lenders and not borrowers.29  In fact, they were vulnerable to this charge in 
part because, although the Home Loan Bank Act did call for direct lending, 
the Banks did not have any such capacity. 
Instead of merely reorganizing the Home Loan Banking System to suit 
the demands for more direct assistance to homeowners, Roosevelt and 
Congress passed the Home Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”) of 1933.30  HOLA 
created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (“HOLC”), which purchased 
mortgages in default from lenders using funds raised in the bond market.31  
HOLC also made refinance loans directly to homeowners with the intent of 
providing a more manageable loan.32  It was capitalized and owned by the 
federal government and governed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.  
To enable homeowners to remain in their homes, HOLC used long-term 
federal bonds to buy the loans, extend the term of loans, and lower monthly 
payments.33  Up to 80% of the loans were fully amortizing over fifteen 
years.34 
HOLC has generally been perceived as successful.  It made loans from 
1933 to 1936 and did not incur substantial losses over the long term.  The 
HOLC received 1.9 million loan applications, accounting for approxi-
mately 40% of homes with residential mortgages during this period.  The 
HOLC funded approximately one million loans for a total of $3.1 billion.35  
HOLC served approximately 20% of homeowners with existing mortgages, 
a remarkable number.36  The HOLC has been accused of institutionalizing 
redlining practices through the use of its risk rating maps.37  While the 
 
 29. A “wholesale institution” is one that does not lend directly to homeowners or home-
buyers, but rather to lenders themselves.  Institutions lending directly to homeowners or 
homebuyers are considered “retail” institutions.  For more information on wholesale lend-
ers, see Jack Guttentag, Mortgage Lenders, Mortgage Brokers & Loan Officers, (Dec. 22, 
2000), http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Type%20of%20Loan%20Provider/lenders 
,_brokers_and_loan_officers. 
 30. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468c (2006)). 
 31. See C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN COR-
PORATION 7-13 (1951) 
 32. See Kristen B. Crossney & David W. Bartelt, The Legacy of the Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation, 16 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 547, 551 (2005). 
 33. See HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 169-70. 
 34. Id. at 170. 
 35. See HARRISS, supra note 31, at 1-2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Crossney & Bartelt, supra note 32, at 571. 
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agency’s maps may have furthered or reinforced redlining practices, it ac-
tually made many loans in areas that it rated as high-risk. 
The next major development in federal mortgage policy was the Na-
tional Housing Act of 1934, which created the Federal Housing Admini-
stration (“FHA”).38  The FHA was created in large part to stimulate job 
creation, but was responsible for introducing a key credit enhancement that 
had a strong direct effect on credit availability and served as a model for 
modern private mortgage insurance, which became a critical tool in assist-
ing homebuyers with less than 20% equity to purchase a house. 
In addition to offering mortgage insurance, the FHA established the 
twenty-year and later, thirty-year, fully amortizing, fixed-rate mortgage 
with an 80% loan-to-value ratio as the dominant, standardized mortgage 
format for the remainder of the twentieth century.39  FHA loans also in-
creased the standardization of mortgages generally, setting the stage for the 
eventual expansion of secondary market activity and securitization that 
dominated the last quarter of the twentieth century.40  The FHA was a ma-
jor force in the standardization and commoditization of mortgage credit.41 
The FHA increased the supply of mortgage credit and allowed for pre-
dictable, low-risk, long-term financing, making the true effective costs of 
financing lower and reducing the risks to borrowers due to uncertainties re-
garding the availability and pricing of credit in the future.  From the 1930s 
to the 1940s, the average term for mortgages made by S&Ls increased from 
eleven years to fifteen years.42  For insurance companies, who were larger 
FHA users, the average term increased from between six to eight years to 
twenty years.43  Overall, the average loan-to-value for mortgages increased 
from less than 60% to 75%, and the bulk of loans became fully amortizing, 
helping homeowners to build equity over time.44 
The FHA had a large impact on the overall housing market.  From 1935 
to 1939, FHA insured loans accounted for 23% of single-family lending.45  
 
 38. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, 1246 (codifed as amended at 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1749 (2006)), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/ 
martin/54_01_19340627.pdf. 
 39. Lea, supra note 12, at 161. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 161-63. 
 42. Id. at 162. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Kerry D. Vandell, FHA Restructuring Proposals:  Alternatives and Implications, 6 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 308 (1995). 
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This share grew to 45% during the years 1940 to 1944, while accounting 
for 22% of outstanding residential mortgage debt by 1945.46 
The end of World War II saw the advent of the Veterans Administration 
(“VA”) program.  Within one year after the war, VA-guaranteed mortgages 
had increased from just 1% of outstanding residential mortgage debt to 9% 
of such debt.47  From 1945 to 1956, during the peak of the postwar subur-
banization boom, VA loans accounted for 35% of net new mortgage flows, 
with the FHA accounting for another 14%.48  The FHA program gradually 
declined in significance, until the late 1960s when Congress authorized a 
substantial expansion of FHA activity, including a major subsidized loan 
component.49  By 1970, FHA loans still accounted for almost 30% of sin-
gle-family loans.50 
The roles of the FHA and the VA in the mortgage market were also as-
sociated with a shift—at least for a while—away from the conventional 
S&L delivery of mortgage finance and toward FHA/VA mortgages, for 
which insurance companies and commercial banks were major lenders 
(S&Ls were relatively smaller players in the FHA and VA loan market).  
Insurance companies, who in the past had purchased individual loans or in-
vested in mortgage company debentures, now began to develop correspon-
dent relationships with mortgage companies, in which they would agree to 
purchase pools of loans from the mortgage companies.  These were not 
mortgage-backed securities, which came later, but literally bulk purchases 
of loans that the insurance company agreed to purchase once they were 
made by the mortgage company.51 
After introducing FHA insurance and before creating the VA loan, the 
federal government created the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(now known as Fannie Mae) in 1938 to create a secondary market in FHA-
insured loans.  Fannie Mae allowed a new form of intermediation between 
non-depository mortgage originators such as mortgage companies and in-
vestment capital from other sources.  This meant that a new source of capi-
tal became available for the mortgage market.  In 1968, Fannie Mae be-
came a “government-sponsored enterprise” (“GSE”), a for-profit, privately 
owned corporation that is subject to some—albeit limited—federal over-
 
 46. See id.; see also SAUL B. KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET 
33 (1961), available at http://www.nber.org/books/klam61-1. 
 47.  See KLAMAN, supra note 46. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Vandell, supra note 45, at 309. 
 51. See KLAMAN, supra note 46, at 245-48. 
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sight.52  Its mission had also changed to focus on providing liquidity to the 
non-GSE, or conventional, mortgage market.53 
Thus, the two major “circuits” for U.S. housing finance both relied heav-
ily on federal intervention and support over the course of their develop-
ment.54  The S&L circuit was supported by deposit insurance and the Home 
Loan Banks provided a critical source of liquidity, while also drawing 
some support from FHA and VA programs.  In the meantime, mortgage 
companies, commercial banks, and insurance companies made loans sup-
ported by FHA and VA programs, and later by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  Prior to the 1960s, the FHA/VA circuit was particularly important.  
Beginning in the late 1960s, as VA and FHA programs declined in their 
overall share of mortgages, the S&L circuit grew more dominant.  This 
generally persisted until the 1980s and the explosion of the GSE secondary 
markets and securitization, which essentially superseded the old FHA/VA 
circuit and once again favored nonlocal lenders such as mortgage compa-
nies.55  In both circuits, the public sector seeded, nurtured, and was largely 
responsible for the size and functioning of mortgage markets, and espe-
cially the dominance of the long-term fixed rate mortgage.56 
These markets were not without serious and pervasive problems, includ-
ing discrimination and redlining.57  Their basic structure, however, consti-
tuted a sound base upon which to build a fairer system, and in the late 
1960s and into the 1970s, a number of federal statutes—the Fair Housing 
Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 
and the Community Reinvestment Act—were adopted toward this end.  
While implementation and enforcement of these laws were frequently lack-
luster, there were occasional periods of significant progress towards fair, 
affordable, and sustainable home finance.58 
C. The Growth of Unstructured, Plain-Vanilla Securitization 
Put most simply and broadly, mortgage securitization is a process in 
which the funding of—or investments in—mortgage loans is separated 
 
 52. See Lea, supra note 12, at 164. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 152-53. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. “Redlining” refers to the practice of not offering or extending credit to certain 
neighborhoods or submarkets due, in part, to the economic or racial composition of the resi-
dents of the area.  See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY:  COMMUNITY RE-
INVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 236-45 (M.E. Sharpe ed., 
2004) [hereinafter IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT]. 
 58. Id. 
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from the origination (and originator) of the loans.  The loans stand, together 
in pools with many other loans, “on their own” and are no longer tied to the 
fate of the originating lender.59  A key objective of securitization is to iso-
late the loans that eventually provide cashflow to the investors from the 
originating lender.  In general, the alternative is either for the loans to be 
sold as individual “whole loans” to buyers who assume these loans as indi-
vidual loans that they (or their agent) then service, or for the loan to remain 
on the balance sheet of the lender.  Debenture sales, like those used by the 
early mortgage companies, are also an alternative, but have not been widely 
used in the United States. 
Securitization led directly to the widespread “vertical disintegration” of 
the lending process.  It enabled the origination process to be separated from 
the process of the funding and servicing of the loan.  This process has also 
been called the unbundling of the mortgage process, although the term un-
bundling is less precise and can refer to several different mortgage market 
processes.  Vertical disintegration meant that more contractual relationships 
were now required among originators, issuers of the securities, investors 
that purchased the securities, credit rating agencies, servicers, and other 
mortgage market participants.60  In the dominant S&L circuit, these func-
tions were generally integrated within the local S&L that originated, 
funded, and serviced the loan. 
Mortgage securitization has often been portrayed as a private-sector fi-
nancial innovation.  Yet, in its early, less structured and complex forms, it 
was the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the 
federal agency that facilitates the purchase of FHA loans, that issued the 
first residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBSs”) in 1970, guarantee-
ing interest and principal payments on pools of FHA- and VA-insured 
mortgages.61  In the mid-1970s, Ginnie Mae also spurred the use of RMBSs 
by directly subsidizing below-market-rate RMBSs so that investors would 
get market-rate returns.62  RMBSs further increased the number and types 
of investors in the mortgage market, as well as the number of new lenders 
in the market.63  Also in 1970, the Emergency Home Finance Act created 
 
 59. For a more extensive discussion of securitization in mortgage markets see ADAM B. 
ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 318, UN-
DERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf. 
 60. See Michael G. Jacobides, Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration:  How 
and Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 465 (2005). 
 61. See CHARLES R. GEISST, VISIONARY CAPITALISM:  FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE 
AMERICAN DREAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 91-93 (1990). 
 62. Id. at 92-93. 
 63. Id. at 93. 
IMMERGLUCK_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:54:04 PM 
460 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, now Freddie Mac, to pro-
vide secondary market capacity for the Home Loan Bank system members 
and allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to perform secondary market 
operations for conventional mortgages. 
The first generation of the RMBS was the “pass-through” certificate.  
Prior to the development of the pass-through RMBS, lenders frequently 
sought to convert loans into cash to replenish their cash available for lend-
ing and to reduce a variety of risks that can come from holding a large 
amount of long-term mortgages on their balance sheets. 
Ginnie Mae, and later Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, reduced the trans-
action costs of converting loans into cash.  They purchased the loans and 
assembled them into pools of similar types of loans.  These pools also en-
abled the diversification of risk by including loans from many lenders and 
different regions.  They then issued “certificates,” in which the cash flow 
generated by the loans in the pool was passed through to the investors in a 
pro-rata fashion.  This was a fairly straightforward and transparent process.  
Again, in addition to the diversification of loans across lenders and regions, 
a major apparent advantage for investors of these new securities compared 
to the old-fashioned debenture issued by mortgage companies prior to the 
Great Depression was the fact that these bonds were not as exposed to the 
risk of the originating lender going bankrupt. 
There are variations on the pass-through structure, including one in 
which the GSE or Ginnie Mae does not actually purchase the loans, but 
guarantees the loan pool that is assembled by another issuing firm.  Regard-
less of the details, this sort of pass-through security does not involve any 
complex hierarchical structuring into different layers of risk.  Therefore, 
such “single-class” pass-throughs are typically not classified as part of 
what are known as “structured finance” vehicles. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac served as buyer-holders of loans in their 
portfolios, as well as conduits of mortgage capital from investors to lend-
ers.  Securitization via the GSEs offered several advantages to lenders.  It 
provided greater diversification in risks in the value of the lender’s assets, 
yielded more liquidity to lenders because these diversified assets are more 
marketable than whole loans, and redistributed credit supply across regions, 
so that regions with few local sources of credit suffered from fewer con-
straints on credit flows. 
One consequence of the growth of securitization and the GSEs, however, 
was that S&Ls lost market share to mortgage companies that had gained 
access to inexpensive funds and were able to offer long-term, fixed rate 
mortgages at competitive interest rates.  The national scope of mortgage 
companies and their lack of branches allowed them to benefit from econo-
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mies of scale and specialization.  S&Ls were still both savings and lending 
institutions that had relied upon their local knowledge for competitive ad-
vantage.  In the age of securitization, such advantages were made much 
less relevant by the commoditization and pooling of residential credit. 
In its early forms at least, securitization promoted the standardization of 
mortgage terms and underwriting requirements.64  This standardization was 
accompanied by an increased supply of computer-processed and national-
scale credit information systems, reducing the benefit of local information.  
Additionally, the scale and inherent subsidies of the secondary markets 
meant that they offered lenders lower cost capital for making mortgages.  
Loans became more standardized and “one-size-fits-all.”  Mortgages in-
creasingly resembled commodities rather than individualized products.  
These changes also resulted in growing economies of scale for most of the 
stages of the lending process, including funding and servicing.  At the same 
time, these large new national lenders—mostly mortgage companies or 
bank-owned mortgage companies—developed more “wholesale” lending 
channels, in which they originated loans through large numbers of some-
times quite small scale and often localized mortgage brokers. 
D. The Rise of Structured, Risk-Inducing Securitization 
Pass-through RMBSs, though assisting in geographically diversifying 
the underlying default risk that investors would face, did little to deal with 
another sort of risk facing investors: prepayment timing risk.  When inter-
est rates decline, borrowers prepay their loan by refinancing.  This can hurt 
pass-through RMBS investors who had hoped for an ongoing, predictable 
income stream from the RMBSs.  At this point, however, it becomes diffi-
cult for these investors to find an investment opportunity that will generate 
the same sort of return at similar levels of overall risk as the original in-
vestment in the security. 
At least partly in order to deal with this problem, Freddie Mac issued the 
first collateralized mortgage obligation (“CMO”) in 1983.65  A CMO is a 
more complicated form of RMBS than a pass-through because it allocates 
prepayment risk across different investors—some of whom are more will-
ing to accept such risks than others—by structuring the security into differ-
ent segments that pay back over varying schedules.  Also, CMOs offer the 
ability to create a vertical hierarchy of default risk by allowing some bond-
 
 64. See Lea, supra note 12, at 166-68. 
 65. See Frank Nothaft, Chief Economist, Freddie Mac, Celebrating the Anniversary of 
Revolutionary Concepts (May 12, 2003), http://www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/ 
commentary/051203_concepts.htm. 
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holders to receive their principal back before others and some more risk-
tolerant bondholders to bear losses associated with defaults of the underly-
ing loans before the holders of less risky senior bonds.  These different 
segments of risk are called “tranches” (French for “slices”) and are gener-
ally classified according to the rating they receive from the credit rating 
agencies, such as AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, etc. 
CMOs and similar structured finance vehicles had an important impact 
on mortgage markets because they essentially peeled apart various types 
and degrees of risk and allocated these to different classes of investors de-
pending on their appetite and tolerance for different sorts of risk.  In this 
way, investors who would not invest in a pass-through security backed by 
loans exhibiting anything but the lowest default risks or were likely to pre-
pay could invest in a bond that was designed to be highly secure.  These 
AAA senior tranche bonds would provide relatively modest interest rates to 
investors, with lower-rated and riskier tranches earning higher interest 
rates.  CMOs also served investors with different preferences for when they 
would receive their principal back and how much prepayment risk they 
would likely bear.66  In these ways, CMOs appealed to a broader segment 
of potential investors and drew in more capital into mortgage markets.  
They also enabled the capital markets to provide credit to a wider spectrum 
of credit risk at the borrower end. 
Thus, securitization encouraged risk-based pricing (although how accu-
rately the pricing matched the risk is subject to debate) rather than the tradi-
tional system of credit rationing, where essentially no institutional lender 
would lend to borrowers below certain, more conservative risk thresholds.  
In the brave new world of securitization, the more innovation employed, 
and the more the mortgage cash flows were repackaged, the more risk 
could be tolerated in the home financing transaction.  As the risk at the 
origination level increases, defaults and foreclosures increase, which pro-
duce substantial negative spillovers on communities and longer-term im-
pacts on borrowers. 
The issuance of mortgage-backed securities in the subprime market in-
creased from $87 billion in 2001 to almost $450 billion by 2006.67  In the 
“Alt-A” market, issuance of RMBSs increased from approximately $11 bil-
lion in 2001 to more than $365 billion by 2006.68  The combination of this 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 59, at 2. 
 68. Alt-A loans are mortgages that are generally made to borrowers with fairly strong 
credit scores but that exhibit riskier features than prime loans due to the nature of the loan or 
property.  They are often made with little or no documentation of income or assets, for ex-
ample.  Id. 
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explosive growth of securitization since 2001, as well as the decline of 
GSE issuance from 2003 to 2006, meant that the securitization of subprime 
and Alt-A loans together almost equaled total GSE issuance by 2006 ($814 
billion versus $905 billion).  Adding in the non-agency securitization of 
jumbo mortgages meant that non-agency securitization exceeded GSE se-
curitization ($1.033 trillion to $905 billion) in 2006.69 
The simple growth of non-agency CMO-type RMBS was not the entire 
story of why so much capital flowed into high-risk mortgage markets start-
ing in 2002 and 2003.  There were fundamental shifts in the financial engi-
neering of mortgage securities, including most notably the vertical layering 
of securities, which would themselves be comprised not just of underlying 
mortgages, but also of RMBSs themselves—in other words, the creation of 
securities that were themselves generated by cash flows from other securi-
ties.  Thus, the borrowers were now even further removed from the even-
tual funders of their loans.  In the first wave of nonagency securitization, 
pension funds and other institutional investors would invest in RMBS 
which were comprised of thousands of individual mortgages.  They may be 
very senior investors or higher-risk AA or BBB investors, and they relied 
on the credit rating agencies to correctly evaluate the risks of the underly-
ing loans and the tranches (based on available enhancements and the level 
of subordination beneath their particular tranche). 
A new form of highly complex security was used heavily for the sub-
prime and Alt A mortgage markets—the collateralized debt obligation 
(“CDO”).  The CDO involved the additional layering between the institu-
tional investor and the borrowers.  In CDOs, RMBS bonds—particularly 
those with less than AAA ratings—are themselves pooled with RMBS 
bonds derived from other loan pools, which may be of varying quality or 
ratings.  The cash flows from these bonds are then pooled in the new CDO 
special purpose vehicle and a new set of CDO bonds are produced, with 
senior and subordinate tranches.  By this tranching of the cash flow coming 
from a pool of RMBS (and potentially other CDO bonds), the “sow’s ear” 
of lower grade bonds produced what were thought to be “silk purses,” in 
the form of higher rated CDO bonds.  The CDO is generated from a spec-
trum of RMBS and sometimes other kinds of bonds, some of which may be 
other CDO bonds.  Of course this all presumes a great deal of knowledge of 
the risk of the underlying mortgages or other assets, because now investors 
are essentially betting that the arrangement of cash flows from a large 
number of lower or mixed grade investments will yield some amount of 
higher grade investments. 
 
 69. See id. 
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The CDO increased the value of higher-risk, lower-rated CMO bonds, 
thus increasing the markets’ overall appetite for higher risk lending.  In or-
der to provide credit enhancement to the higher rated, senior tranches of 
CMOs, originators were often required to purchase the lowest-rated, high-
est risk “residual” tranches from the CMOs derived from their loans.  Be-
yond reducing risk to higher-tranche investors, the assumption of the resid-
ual should theoretically encourage the lender to be more risk-averse in its 
lending because it will absorb the first losses emanating from the loan pool.  
The CDO market, however, enabled some lenders to sell off their residual 
interests to CDO arrangers, thereby reducing its “skin in the game” or ex-
posure to losses from its own lending practices.70 
Another innovation employed in the second high-risk lending boom was 
the structured investment vehicle (“SIV”).  An SIV was a specialized in-
vestment company set up solely to purchase long-term, fixed income in-
vestment assets, such as mortgage-backed securities by using less expen-
sive, shorter-term commercial paper.71  SIVs required the ability to borrow 
frequently and inexpensively, both to remain liquid and to earn a profit.  
Commercial and investment banks set up SIVs as off-balance sheet invest-
ments, to reduce their risk.  Many banks, however, essentially guaranteed 
the liquidity of SIVs, ensuring that they would refinance the commercial 
paper debt if needed.  Thus, when the credit crisis hit in 2007, many banks 
were forced to essentially bail out the SIVs that they had set up and man-
aged, sometimes actually acquiring their assets and putting them on the 
banks’ balance sheet.72 
What came to be known as “structured finance,” the engineering of 
CMOs, CDOs, SIVs, and other complex mortgage-related investment vehi-
cles, turned out to suffer from a broad array of perverse incentives and 
transactional failures.73  Without sufficient regulatory oversight or inter-
ventions, these vehicles helped produce large amounts of default risk in the 
origination of home loans. 
 
 
 70. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye:  Wall Street Fi-
nance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2040, 2066-68 (2007). 
 71. Standard & Poor’s, Structured Investment Vehicle Criteria, http://www2. 
standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article_print/2,1,1,0,1031342466642.html 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
 72. See Shannon Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate Seven SIVs 
on Balance Sheet, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=amwIRXuKwRR8&refer=home. 
 73. See ASHCRAFT & SCHUERMANN, supra note 59; see also IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED, 
supra note 6, at 100-11. 
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II.  FEDERAL POLICY IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY:  NURTURING 
SECURITIZATION, THE DECLINE OF ORIGINATE-TO-HOLD LENDING, 
AND BACK-DOOR DEREGULATION 
Although Fannie Mae was created in 1938 and Ginnie Mae and Freddie 
Mac introduced RMBSs in 1970 and 1971, the eventual dominance of se-
curitization in mortgage markets by the late twentieth century is perhaps 
best attributed to federal financial deregulation of the early 1980s followed 
by some specific industry-supported legislation later in that decade.  By 
explicitly favoring the securitization circuit over the traditionally dominant 
S&L circuit, federal policy-makers provided critical help in shifting the 
structure of the mortgage industry in at least three ways: 1) from a pre-
dominantly local to a predominantly national system; 2) from an originate-
to-hold model to an originate-to-distribute model; and 3) from one in which 
most loans were made by relatively more regulated lenders (S&Ls) to one 
in which predominantly unregulated mortgage companies and a growing 
set of essentially unregulated mortgage brokers dominated.74  Combined 
with the failure of policy-makers and regulatory agencies to increase regu-
latory supervision of these emerging lenders and the federal preemption of 
state regulations, these moves meant that the path toward greater overall 
deregulation of the mortgage marketplace was well paved by the middle to 
late 1980s.  Moreover, legislators and regulators constructed policy that al-
lowed for regulated depository institutions, especially commercial banks, to 
acquire or affiliate with these less regulated entities so that the new finan-
cial conglomerates could conduct most of their mortgage lending through 
less regulated and supervised mortgage company subsidiaries and affiliates, 
thereby minimizing regulatory oversight. 
A critical ingredient to the growth of securitization was the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198075  
(“DIDMCA”), which phased in the general abolition of state usury limits 
on first mortgages by 1986.76  DIDMCA also extended the ability of na-
 
 74. “Originate-to-hold” lending, or sometimes called “portfolio lending,” is a process in 
which a lender makes a loan and does not sell or securitize it afterwards.  The lender holds 
the loan “in portfolio,” until it is paid off or defaults.  “Originate-to-distribute” lending is the 
alternative, and can take several forms.  The lender originates the loan but then relatively 
quickly sells it to another party or bundles it with other loans either for a bulk sale or securi-
tizes it directly.  See Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the 
Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis (Mar. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1167786. 
 75. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 76. See PATRICIA A. MCCOY & ELIZABETH RENUART, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SUBPRIME AND NONTRADITIONAL HOME 
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tional banks (those regulated by the OCC) to be governed only by the usury 
limits of their home state to most other types of depository institutions.77  
This ability, labeled “interest rate exportation,” allowed depositories to 
generally override state usury limits.  The ability to export rates from low 
regulation states, which was given to national banks in a 1978 Supreme 
Court decision, made it harder to regulate from the state level and allowed 
large national lenders increased advantages in the marketplace, again in-
creasing returns to scale in the industry.78 
With the adoption of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act79 
(“AMTPA”) in 1982, federal policy-makers continued moving to override 
state consumer credit protections and make it easier to commoditize credit 
at a national scale, thus fueling large scale delocalized lending sources.80  
AMTPA overrode state laws that regulated various terms of “alternative” 
loans, including those with features such as adjustable interest rates and 
balloon payments.81  The law also allowed mortgage companies, which are 
primarily state-regulated, to opt for federal regulations issued by the federal 
S&L regulator (now the Office of Thrift Supervision) rather than comply 
with the lending regulations of the state in which they were operating.  
Thus, AMTPA provided significant federal preemption to non-depository 
lenders, similar to the expanded federal preemption that DIDMCA had 
provided to depository institutions.  And these non-depositories were pre-
cisely the sort who relied especially on securitization as a means of funding 
their loans.  Ironically, DIDMCA and AMTPA were partly designed to 
help S&Ls recover from their struggles in the financial marketplace.  In the 
long run at least, they most likely did the opposite. 
The RMBS market grew during the decade, with issuance by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac increasing from $14 billion in 1982 to $160 billion 
in 1986.82  In addition to the policy changes, the development of the CMO 
was a parallel factor in RMBS growth, but it is unlikely that this level of 
growth would have occurred without the deregulatory actions in DIDMCA 
and AMTPA. 
 
MORTGAGES 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/ 
understanding_consumer_credit/papers/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf. 
 77. Id. at 6. 
 78. Id. at 5, 16-17. 
 79. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 
1545 (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 80. Id. at 6-7. 
 81. Id. at 6, 17. 
 82. See Peter Chinloy, Public and Conventional Mortgages and Mortgage-Backed Secu-
rities, 6 J. HOUSING RES. 173, 186 (1995). 
IMMERGLUCK_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:54:04 PM 
2009] PRIVATE RISK, PUBLIC RISK 467 
The early 1980s were also important for laying the groundwork for later 
policy changes that directly supported mortgage securitization.  In 1981, 
President Reagan created the President’s Commission on Housing in part to 
look at housing finance problems, including unstable interest rates and the 
problems they caused for the mortgage market.  In 1982, the Commission 
found that: 
a broader-based and more resilient system will be needed to supply the 
funds a strengthened housing finance system will require. . . . [T]he nation 
can no longer rely so completely on a system of highly regulated and spe-
cialized mortgage investors and a single type of mortgage instrument if 
the strong underlying demand for housing credit is to be met.83 
As the director of the Commission later recalled, the Commission argued 
that all sorts of lenders and borrowers should have “unrestricted access” to 
the money and capital markets.  Moreover, the Commission advocated that 
mortgage-market participants—and by this it appears they were thinking 
more of investors and originators than of borrowers—should have “reliable 
ways of managing interest-rate risk.”84  The Commission went on to rec-
ommend a variety of specific policy proposals to more closely and easily 
link broader capital markets to the “underlying demand” for housing credit.  
These included exempting RMBS from taxation at the issuing level, having 
the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgate regulations for 
streamlined self-registration of issuing RMBS, and other regulatory 
changes. 
At least two statutes followed directly from the recommendations of the 
President’s Commission.  First, the 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market En-
hancement Act85 (“SMMEA”) facilitated non-GSE or “private-label” secu-
ritization in various ways, including exempting RMBSs from state-level 
registration and expanding the ability of banks and thrifts to hold RMBSs 
as assets on their balance sheets.86  The CMO was also directly supported 
by a piece of the 1986 Tax Reform Act,87 which created the Real Estate 
Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”), a legal structure for trusts that 
are used in structured RMBS, especially CMOs.  REMICs eliminated any 
 
 83. Kent W. Colton, The Report of the President’s Commission on Housing: The Na-
tion’s System of Housing Finance, 11 REAL EST. ECON. 133 (1983). 
 84. See Kent W. Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of 
the U.S. Housing Finance System 11 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working 
Paper W02-5, 2002). 
 85. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 
1689 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1 (2006)). 
 86. See MCCOY & RENUART, supra note 76, at 8 & n.40. 
 87. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codifed in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C). 
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problems with potential “double” taxation of cash flows as they flow 
through the CMO.88 
By furthering securitization and enabling lenders utilizing the secondary 
markets to provide loans at lower cost, at greater scale, and across a larger 
geographic scope, DIDMCA and the pro-securitization policies put pres-
sure on traditional, localized S&Ls.  They had difficulty competing on 
price or terms.  Larger, national scale mortgage companies could provide 
loans at lower cost, in part because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac passed on 
some of their explicit and implicit federal subsidies in the form of lower-
cost capital. 
The Garn-St. Germain Act89 also allowed depositories to cross state lines 
to acquire failing institutions, providing the first major move toward inter-
state banking.90  At the same time, depositories capitalized on the increas-
ing failures of thrifts and banks to argue for eliminating limitations on in-
trastate bank branching.  Then, in the late 1980s, more changes in bank and 
thrift regulation supported the growth of securitization even more.  The 
1989 Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act91 
(“FIRREA”)—the S&L “bailout” bill—required thrifts to rid themselves of 
loans to improve their liquidity and lower their risks.  This was followed 
shortly by similar rules for banks via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) of 1991.92  Mortgages in portfolio re-
ceived a 50% reserve requirement rating while RMBSs received only 
20%.93  This effectively increased the cost to depositories of holding loans 
in portfolios. 
By the 1990s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s loan purchases accounted 
for more than one half of new mortgage originations.  The preemption of 
state consumer protections increased the market for RMBSs by increasing 
the returns to investors (by increasing fees and rates paid by borrowers).  
By stoking the creation and growth of a new set of lenders, by removing 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 
1469 (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 90. See DAVID R. ALLARDICE ET AL., THE GARN-ST. GERMAIN DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 
ACT OF 1982:  THE IMPACT ON BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 19 (1983), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/1983/ep_mar_apr1983_part1
_garcia.pdf. 
 91. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 92. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codifed in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 93. FED. RESERVE BD., DIFFERENCES IN CAPITAL AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AMONG 
THE FEDERAL BANKING AND THRIFT AGENCIES (1999), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
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deposit rate regulations favoring S&Ls, and by fostering the development 
of the mortgage brokerage industry, federal policy essentially constituted 
the death-knell for S&Ls and installed a regime of both government-
sponsored and private-label securitization as the dominant sources of mort-
gage capital. 
The decline of the S&L circuit (thrifts) began in the mid-1970s as 
RMBS issuance began.  When S&L market share began dropping in the 
1980s it was essentially absorbed by GSE RMBSs.  Private label RMBSs 
began slowly in the mid-1980s but began to grow at a faster pace in the 
early 1990s, as the early subprime mortgage market developed.  By 1995, 
the GSEs and GSE mortgage RMBSs accounted for 51% of outstanding 
mortgage credit.94  Banks had reached a share of 19%, with thrifts down to 
14%.95  Thrifts were down from a high of 58% in 1973 and 26% in 1989, 
the year of the FIRREA savings and loan crisis bill.96  Private-label 
RMBSs were just beginning to get started, rising from 2% of outstanding 
mortgages in 1990 to 6% in 1995.97 
III.  POLICY DEBATES OVER REGULATING HIGH-RISK MORTGAGE 
LENDING, 1995–2008 
Much of the media coverage of the 2007–2008 mortgage crisis gave the 
impression that the problems of high-risk lending had come as a total sur-
prise to policy-makers.  There was often little mention of well documented 
problems in the high-risk mortgage market dating back to the middle-to-
late 1990s and the decade-long policy battle over regulating subprime 
loans.  Federal regulators were said to be “asleep at the wheel” and some-
how missed this major development in credit markets.98 
The increase in high-risk mortgages from 2002–2007 followed a major, 
albeit smaller, boom in subprime lending in the late 1990s.  Some minor 
changes in federal regulation of subprime refinance lending occurred in 
2001 through changes to regulations implementing the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act99 (“HOEPA”) in response to problems during the 
first subprime boom.  The financial services industry, however, success-
fully fought off most calls for increased regulation.100 
 
 94. See IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED, supra note 6, at 45. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Regulatory Underkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2008, at A13. 
 99. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 
2190. 
 100. See IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT, supra note 57, at 211-35. 
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As problems of predatory lending and higher foreclosure rates among 
subprime loans came to light in the late 1990s, consumer and community 
groups around the country became increasingly focused on the issue.  
There were concerns and policy debates over predatory and high-cost lend-
ing before the late 1990s.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Washington-
D.C. based consumer advocates such as the National Consumer Law Cen-
ter and others worked to get HOEPA passed in 1994.101  HOEPA was fo-
cused on increasing regulation of very high-cost home equity and refinanc-
ing loans.  It established a threshold of loan pricing and loans priced over 
this threshold became subject to special disclosures and a few prohibitions 
of certain loan practices and terms.  Consumer advocates argued for 
stronger restrictions on high-cost loans, but were only successful at obtain-
ing regulations that relied primarily on increasing disclosures to borrowers. 
While HOEPA may have had some restraining effect on small, “hard-
money” lenders that charged interest rates in the high teens and low twen-
ties, it did not restrain subprime lending in any meaningful way and may 
have, in fact, provided the regulatory context for the growth of the market.  
Besides relying mostly on additional disclosures as the fundamental way to 
protect borrowers, HOEPA employed pricing thresholds or “triggers” over 
which proscriptive regulations would kick in.  These thresholds, however, 
were generally much too high to address the vast majority of subprime 
loans and could be easily avoided by pricing just under the threshold or by 
shifting pricing from interest rates to up-front fees or contingent fees that 
were not included in the pricing calculations.102  The subprime market ac-
tually grew faster after 1995, especially for refinance lending, the primary 
target of HOEPA.  With the explosion of the subprime market came the 
growth of predatory lending and, soon, an increase in defaults and foreclo-
sures as well. 
In 1997, the Federal Reserve Board, which is responsible for adopting 
regulations under the HOEPA, examined early implementation of the law.  
The following year, the Board, together with the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, issued a joint report to Congress that addressed 
issues such as loan-flipping, credit insurance, and related issues of abusive 
 
 101. See NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP, DEFENDING THE DREAM:  HOW FUNDERS CAN 
CURTAIL PREDATORY LENDING TO HELP INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES 25 (D. Visser ed., 
2006), available at http://www.nfg.org/publications/Defending_the_Dream_2006.pdf. 
 102. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REGARDING PROPOSED REGULATIONS RELATING TO 
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN CONNECTION WITH MORTGAGE LENDING 5-6 (2007), available 
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and predatory lending.103  Few of the recommendations, however, were 
ever implemented. 
Some states moved to increase regulation of subprime lending in the 
middle-to-late 1990s.104  Some restricted the use of prepayment penalties or 
balloon payments in mortgages.  Other states tightened mortgage broker 
and banker licensing and regulation.  These laws, however, were generally 
not very comprehensive and attacked only small pieces of the abusive and 
predatory lending problem. 
As subprime lending reached a critical mass in the late 1990s, the dis-
proportionate concentration of high-risk loans in urban neighborhoods be-
gan to be felt more acutely, especially in the form of foreclosures and 
abandoned housing.  Moreover, subprime and predatory lending became 
not just a consumer issue but also posed problems for community devel-
opment.  Concentrated foreclosures hurt neighborhoods and cities, adding 
to the unfairness of the loss of homes to individual families. 
A. North Carolina Makes the First Big Move Toward More 
Comprehensive Regulation of Subprime Loans 
Advocates for stronger mortgage regulation found some initial success at 
the state and local levels.  In North Carolina, a state with a long history of 
community reinvestment activism, a number of organizations became in-
volved in the issue.  These included the country’s largest community de-
velopment credit union, the Center for Self-Help, as well as the Community 
Reinvestment Association of North Carolina and the North Carolina Fair 
Housing Center.  This group formed the hub of the Coalition for Responsi-
ble Lending, which was able to gain the support of a major statewide 
elected official, the attorney general, who played a significant role in the 
legislative campaign.  The legislature’s black caucus was also suppor-
tive.105 
Advocates for increased regulation of subprime home loans in North 
Carolina developed a bill that would go far beyond HOEPA in limiting the 
practices that could be used in making high-cost loans.  In the summer of 
1999, the North Carolina legislature passed the first comprehensive anti-
predatory lending legislation in the country.  The bill followed the thresh-
 
 103. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & THE DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 
AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (1998), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf. 
 104. See Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Antipredatory Lending Laws:  The Ef-
fect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 47, 49 (2008). 
 105. See IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT, supra note 57, at 212-13. 
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old approach of HOEPA, but set the triggers significantly lower so that the 
law would capture a substantial segment of subprime loans while avoiding 
prime loans.  It then prohibited certain lending features that, in the case of 
high-cost lending, were often viewed as predatory.  The bill was supported 
by both the Mortgage Bankers Association of North Carolina and the North 
Carolina Association of Mortgage Brokers. 
Following the North Carolina law, two states, New York and Massachu-
setts, issued regulations aimed at the predatory lending problem, although 
these measures were substantially weaker than the North Carolina legisla-
tion.  Other states began debating similar measures.  On the local level, the 
City of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, each proposed local ordinances 
aimed at the problem in early 2000.106  Unlike the North Carolina legisla-
tion, the Chicago and Cook County ordinances did not call for regulating 
lenders.  Rather, the proposals relied on a significant history of local laws 
aimed at encouraging banks to be socially responsible by linking govern-
ment financial business to responsible banking.  Chicago, for example, had 
an ordinance dating back to 1974 that required banks accepting municipal 
deposits to disclose data on their lending in the city. 
The Chicago ordinance and others like it in Oakland, Atlanta, Dayton, 
Cleveland, and Detroit sought to withdraw municipal business from firms 
engaged in predatory lending.  These laws followed earlier municipal de-
posit ordinances aimed at encouraging banks to reinvest in urban neighbor-
hoods.  They also bore close resemblance to anti-Apartheid ordinances that 
many cities passed in the 1980s, in which cities refused to do business with 
firms that invested in South Africa.  The industry responded quickly by ap-
pealing to state legislatures, where they had more lobbying experience and 
relationships, to override the local ordinances.  Some of the local predatory 
lending ordinances—including those in Detroit, Dayton, and Cleveland—
were soon overridden by state legislation or by state courts.  By preempting 
these incentive ordinances, state legislatures or courts told local govern-
ments that they did not have a right to choose the financial institutions with 
which they did business. 
B. Lenders, the GSEs, and the Credit Rating Agencies Fight 
Attempts to Regulate High-Risk Mortgage Lending at the State Level 
Following the initial actions of a few early states, other states continued 
to consider more comprehensive antipredatory lending regulations.  By 
 
 106. See Malcom Bush & Daniel Immergluck, Research, Advocacy and Community Re-
investment, in ORGANIZING ACCESS TO CAPITAL:  ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 162-64 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2003). 
IMMERGLUCK_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:54:04 PM 
2009] PRIVATE RISK, PUBLIC RISK 473 
2007, all but seven states had some manner of “mini-HOEPA” statutes or 
sets of laws restricting prepayment penalties, balloon payments, or preda-
tory practices or terms.107  There was great variation, however, in both 
what sorts of loans these statutes covered and the extent to which the laws 
proscribed various practices or products.108  Many state statutes were not 
very comprehensive or very strong.  Some essentially just recreated the 
federal HOEPA protections in state law.  Many so-called “anti-predatory 
lending” laws at the state level had been heavily influenced by state bank-
ing lobbyists.  The result was that the pricing thresholds over which the 
regulations would kick in were often the same as the very high federal 
HOEPA thresholds and the restrictions themselves were often very mini-
mal. 
When consumer advocates and community organizations made efforts to 
strengthen lending regulations, they were often thwarted by industry advo-
cates and lobbyists.  Banking and financial services lobby groups have tra-
ditionally had a great deal of influence over state legislatures in the mort-
gage regulation arena.  Moreover, federal banking laws put pressure on 
state legislatures to accommodate banking interests.  Because banks are al-
lowed to export interest rate and fee regulations from their home state, they 
often aggressively lobby state legislatures for favorable regulations that 
they can then use to override regulations in other states. 
Economic development has frequently been used as a major argument in 
such lobbying.  Lenders sometimes agree to maintain facilities—or simply 
the “main office” location—in the home state in exchange for favorable 
regulations.  Some states have gone so far as passing laws aimed at encour-
aging bank locations and facilities by reducing regulations in exchange for 
economic development commitments by the institutions.  Delaware, for ex-
ample, passed a law in 1981 that eliminated fee and rate restrictions on 
consumer loans and reduced income taxes in exchange for employing at 
least 100 people in the state.109  Other banks have worked to win regulatory 
concessions on mortgage regulations, which they can then export around 
the country.  A very large bank lobbied the Illinois legislature unsuccess-
fully in 2000 and 2001 to gain exemption from essentially any regulations 
on fees for second mortgages, a freedom which it would then be able to ex-
port to other states.  The bank holding company argued that economic de-
velopment would occur as a result of the policy and threatened to locate its 
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new main charter in Ohio or another state if the deregulatory bill did not 
pass.110 
Key actors in state-level policy debates were the GSEs Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and the three primary credit rating agencies, Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch.  These firms had significant leverage over 
state policy-makers.  The GSEs could refuse to purchase certain types of 
loans in a state.  The rating agencies could refuse to rate mortgage-backed 
securities containing loans covered by certain state laws, severely limiting 
regular liquidity and marketability of such loans, at least in the near term. 
Beginning in Georgia in early 2003, the GSEs and the credit rating 
agencies became actively involved in influencing state legislation by pro-
claiming that it would not rate securities containing any loans covered by 
the state’s new antipredatory lending law. 
In 2001, on the heels of the hearings held around the country on preda-
tory lending by federal agencies, Senator Vincent Fort introduced an anti-
predatory lending bill in the Georgia state legislature.111  In the next session 
in 2002, Governor Roy Barnes, an ally of Fort’s on the predatory lending 
issue, introduced what was to become the Georgia Fair Lending Act 
(“GFLA”).  After undergoing a number of changes, the bill was passed and 
went into effect in late 2002.  The law was immediately considered one of 
the strongest state anti-predatory lending laws in the country.  Built off of 
North Carolina’s statute, the Georgia law was stronger, especially because 
it held purchasers of loans accountable for violations of the law, in what is 
known as assignee liability, something the North Carolina law lacked.  As-
signee liability was a key issue, because it meant that a regulatory violation 
followed the loan through the securitization process and affected subse-
quent parties in the chain of capital.  This essentially overrode the problem 
created by the holder-in-due-course doctrine, which enabled funders of 
loans to shield themselves from liabilities created by predatory and abusive 
practices by brokers and others in the origination process. 
Immediately after the law went into effect, the lending and mortgage 
brokerage industry began a concerted campaign to overturn it, especially 
after Governor Barnes lost his reelection bid in late 2002.112  They gained 
their most important ally in early 2003, when Standard & Poor’s issued a 
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press release saying that it would not rate securities backed by Georgia 
mortgages for fear that some of the underlying loans might violate GFLA.  
The press release stated: 
Loans governed by the GFLA are categorized as “Home Loans”, “Cov-
ered Home Loans”, or “High Cost Home Loans”, with each category hav-
ing its own requirements and, in the case of Covered Home Loans and 
High Cost Home Loans, fees, points, and annual percentage rate tests.  
According to Standard & Poor’s, violations of the statute will subject non-
complying parties to potentially severe liability.  Most importantly, how-
ever, the GFLA subjects assignees of Home Loans that violate the Act to 
potential liability.  Thus, transaction parties in securitizations, including 
depositors, issuers and servicers, might all be subject to penalties for vio-
lations under the GFLA.113 
This press release, which was later followed by similar actions by 
Moody’s and Fitch, was the critical factor in enabling opponents of GFLA 
to severely weaken the law by essentially removing the assignee liability 
provision.  In a letter to Standard & Poor’s CEO, Senator Fort pointed out 
that Standard & Poor’s misconstrued the original GFLA assignee liability 
provision, which actually only applied to high-cost loans.114  The letter also 
asked Standard & Poor’s to identify and explain the firm’s financial rela-
tionships with lenders, issuers, and brokers, suggesting that the firm may 
have been suffering from conflicts of interest and benefiting from contin-
ued securitization of high-risk products.115  It was not long before lending 
industry advocates had managed to have GFLA replaced by a much weaker 
law, in which the assignee liability provisions were effectively gutted. 
Contrary to some of the media discussion that followed the Georgia de-
bate, rating agencies could rate securities with assignee liability provisions, 
as long as the potential damages from the provisions could be quantified.116  
Nonetheless, efforts to create assignee liability provisions in state or federal 
regulations, even when damages were made quantifiable, were a key flash-
point for industry advocates in mobilizing against regulation. 
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C. Federal Agencies Study Abusive Lending and Regulators Warn of 
Subprime Risks to Banks 
In 1999 and 2000, a variety of developments were putting pressure on 
federal regulators to act on the predatory lending problem.  In 1998, lower 
mortgage rates and higher prepayment rates lowered subprime lender prof-
itability.  Moreover, many subprime lenders experienced higher default 
rates than they had anticipated.117  On top of this the Asian and Russian fi-
nancial crises of 1997 and 1998 made raising capital much more difficult.  
The result was the failure of a significant number of subprime lenders. 
On the policy front, states were looking closely at the North Carolina 
law and a variety of localities were considering local ordinances aimed at 
slowing abusive lending.  In 1999, the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) and the U.S. Treasury Department created a 
Task Force to develop federal policy recommendations to address preda-
tory lending.118  The HUD-Treasury Task Force held hearings in five large 
cities in the spring of 2000 and issued a report in June containing a number 
of federal policy recommendations, including calling on the Federal Re-
serve Board to use more of its authority under HOEPA to outlaw predatory 
practices. 
In Congress, separate and opposing bills were introduced in Congress 
backed by consumer and industry interest groups.  In May 2000, the House 
Banking Committee held a hearing on predatory lending in which the Fed-
eral Reserve Board was chastised by Chairman Jim Leach (R-IA) for not 
using its authority to act on the issue.  The Federal Reserve had not acted 
on the recommendations made in the 1998 joint Federal Reserve-HUD 
HOEPA report.  Chairman Leach asked, “if there is a problem out there, if 
Congress has given very strong authority to regulators and the Federal Re-
serve, our regulators, is the Federal Reserve AWOL?  That is a question 
that I think demands a response.”119 
Even before the surge of federal policy activity in 1999 and 2000, fed-
eral bank regulators had recognized the growth of subprime lending and at 
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least its risks to lenders.  In March 1999, the four bank and thrift regulators 
issued an “Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending.”120  This guidance, 
however, was clearly focused on the need for depository institutions to 
minimize any institutional risk that they may have had in holding high-risk 
subprime loans on their balance sheets.  The eight page guidance devoted 
less than half of a page to concerns over consumer protection, and much of 
this was concerned with how well banks “identify, monitor and control the 
consumer protection hazards associated with subprime lending.”121  The 
guidance did address some of the risks that originators faced in making and 
securitizing subprime loans, but did not address the risks that banks and 
thrifts took on in purchasing subprime mortgage-backed securities to hold 
on their balance sheets. 
State and local policy developments, the HUD-Treasury report, and pub-
lic and congressional concern led the Federal Reserve Board to hold public 
hearings in four large cities in the summer and fall of 2000 on potential re-
visions to HOEPA regulations.  At the end of 2000, the Board proposed 
some significant, albeit modest, changes to the HOEPA rules.  The largest 
changes in the rules involved classifying single-premium credit insurance 
(“SPCI”) within the definition of fees under HOEPA and lowering the in-
terest rate threshold at which a loan would be classified as “high-cost.”  
The former meant that almost any loan with single premium credit insur-
ance would be classified as a high-cost loan under HOEPA (since SPCI 
typically exceeds the 8% point fee trigger in the law), thereby increasing 
the disclosures and protections associated with the loan.  The latter meant 
that more high-rate loans would be covered by HOEPA.  The Board, how-
ever, failed to use its broader powers under the Act to more substantially 
expand the coverage or impact of the law. 
The most successful effort by consumer and community advocates was 
the push to effectively ban SPCI.  Considered by many to be an egregious 
predatory practice, SPCI involved selling people insurance that covers loan 
payments should some calamity (for example, death or disability) occur.  
SPCI was relatively unique among insurance products, however,  in that it 
was financed completely up-front into the loan.  With SPCI, rather than pay 
the premiums monthly or some other periodic way, the borrower paid the 
entire five to ten years of insurance up-front via the premium being added 
onto the mortgage amount.  The lump-sum premiums for such policies 
could amount to 15% of the principal amount of the loan.  This increased 
the loan amount and reduced borrower equity.  Moreover, unlike in the 
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case of insurance that is paid monthly, if the borrower got into trouble, she 
could not stop paying the insurance portion of her monthly payment with-
out defaulting on the mortgage. 
Consumer and community groups began focusing on problems with the 
product as a key focus of their anti-predatory lending campaigns.  By the 
summer of 2000, consumer activism on SPCI and the inherent problems 
with the product compelled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pledge not to 
purchase loans containing the product.  Following this, the product was 
condemned in the HUD/Treasury Report, and later in 2000, the Federal Re-
serve recommended including SPCI in the HOEPA definition of points and 
fees.  Then, by the summer of 2001, three large sellers of SPCI voluntarily 
announced that they would no longer offer it.  By the end of 2001, the Fed-
eral Reserve finalized its proposal to include SPCI in the definition of 
points and fees, which essentially made any loan with SPCI a high-cost 
loan under HOEPA and therefore subject to heightened regulation.122 
1. The OTS and OCC Act to Preempt State Regulation of High-Risk 
Lending 
As more states began to adopt predatory lending regulations in 2001 and 
2002, lenders began to turn to Washington to push for lender-friendly fed-
eral policies that would override state laws.  Lenders argued that state laws 
would create a “patchwork” of regulation across the country that would re-
duce the efficiency of the banking system by making it difficult for lenders 
and secondary market firms to operate national lending operations.  Advo-
cates of state laws, including governors, attorneys general, and legislators, 
countered that states have a right to protect their citizens, especially when it 
came to something as important as protection of homeowners and borrow-
ers.  Moreover, much of real estate law—including foreclosure law—
already varied across states, and mortgage markets had accommodated 
such differences without causing significant harm to credit access.  In fact, 
by the early 2000s, vendors had begun marketing software that enabled 
lenders to monitor compliance with various state predatory lending laws.  
One firm, for example, marketed a product called the “Predatory Lending 
Monitor,” which interfaced with major loan origination systems.  From 
September 2002 to March 2003, the company had completed nineteen in-
stallations of the product.123 
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To block state predatory lending laws in the early 2000s, the lending in-
dustry pursued a mixed strategy of seeking a federal statute aimed at pre-
empting state laws and, at the same time, trying to get federal bank regula-
tors to preempt state laws.  The first approach would remain difficult as 
long as Democrats held significant power in the Senate and, perhaps more 
importantly, as long as Senator Paul Sarbanes, a supporter of increased 
mortgage regulation retained the ranking Democratic seat on the Senate 
Banking committee.  Therefore, lenders—particularly banks, thrifts and 
bank-owned mortgage-companies—also adopted the second strategy.  Both 
thrifts and national banks appealed to their federal regulators (the OTS and 
the OCC, respectively) to preempt state predatory lending regulations.  The 
OTS regulates federal savings banks and the OCC national banks.  Federal 
law gave both regulators significant ability to preempt state consumer pro-
tection regulations.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they wielded such 
power aggressively, rebuffing states’ attempts to adapt consumer protection 
laws to a changing financial marketplace, something Congress and federal 
regulators were not doing. 
Unfortunately for those who favor state authority in this arena, some 
federal regulators have a vested interest in preempting state consumer pro-
tection laws.  The ability to preempt state law is perhaps the greatest source 
of value in the federal thrift and national bank charters.  Regulators can 
gain political power based on the number and size of the banks that fall un-
der their regulatory supervision.  In the some cases, a regulator’s operations 
are funded by levying fees on the institutions they regulate.  This can en-
courage an agency to pursue policies that are friendly to banks—especially 
larger ones.  If a regulator does not use its ability to allow banks under its 
supervision to preempt state consumer protection regulations, the bank may 
change its charter so that it is regulated by a more lender-friendly agency.  
The impacts of charter changes can be significant.  Even one very large 
bank shifting its charter to another regulator can significantly affect an 
agency’s revenues.  When Chase Manhattan Bank (now J.P. Morgan 
Chase) merged with Chemical Bank in 1995 and changed from a national 
to a state charter, it was estimated that the OCC lost 2% of its budget in 
fees.124  Even if an agency’s funding is not directly tied to the banking as-
sets under its supervision, if fewer and fewer institutions fall under its su-
pervisory umbrella, its power and relevance will be called into question.  In 
the long run, this could jeopardize the agency’s very existence. 
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The more power that a regulator has to effectively override state regula-
tions—and the more it exercises such power—the more likely it is that in-
stitutions will want to be chartered under that regulator’s authority.  In the 
past, competition between regulators was mostly restricted between the na-
tional bank (OCC) charter and the state charter (FDIC, Federal Reserve, 
and state regulators).  As thrifts were allowed to behave more like commer-
cial banks, however, and banks became more involved in mortgage mar-
kets, the thrift-bank distinction became less meaningful, increasing the 
competition among regulators. 
There have been repeated concerns that banks “forum shop” to find the 
most comfortable regulator.125  Since at least the late 1990s, this “race for 
the bottom” includes regulators vying to offer banks as much preemption 
power as they can.  Demonstrating the importance of preemption to the 
value of a charter type, a banking attorney was quoted in the American 
Banker regarding the OCC’s preemption actions as asking, “Why would 
you want a national charter but for the preemption authority?”126 
The OTS moved first to override state mortgage regulations by preempt-
ing key provisions of Georgia’s predatory lending law in January of 2003, 
so that federal thrifts were exempted from the law.  A week later, it pre-
empted New York’s state predatory lending law.  State regulators immedi-
ately objected to the OTS moves.  Community groups saw the OTS’ ac-
tion—under Bush appointee James Gilleran—as particularly antagonistic, 
given that the preceding director of the OTS, Clinton appointee Ellen 
Seidman, had voiced some of the strongest concerns over predatory lending 
among federal regulators.127 
The OCC was not about to let the thrift charter gain a clear regulatory 
advantage over the national bank charter.  It had issued a letter to national 
banks in November 2002 asserting its jurisdiction over all state regulators 
and asked banks to inform it if a state regulator may have asserted its au-
thority over a national bank.  In comments to the press after the OTS deci-
sion, the OCC pointed out that it needed a request from a bank before it 
could follow the OTS’ preemption move.128 
 
 125. See Ann B. Matasar & Deborah D. Pavelka, Federal Banking Regulators’ Competi-
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It was not long before a national bank, National City Bank of Cleveland, 
requested that the OCC preempt the Georgia law.  Community groups, 
governors, attorneys general, and state legislatures argued that the OCC 
should not move to preempt state consumer protection laws.  In the summer 
of 2003, the OCC did preempt the Georgia antipredatory lending law, even 
after industry interests had succeeded in weakening the law at the state 
level.129  The agency went on to suggest that it would preempt all similar 
state laws, and issued proposed regulations to do so.  The OCC’s move in 
some ways was a more assertive move in defense of banks to ignore state 
laws, because its authority under banking statutes to preempt state con-
sumer protection laws was less well established. 
Federal regulators went even further and argued that even mortgage 
lenders that were subsidiaries of national banks or federal thrifts would 
benefit from federal preemption.  The federal courts upheld this position 
when challenged by state regulators.  The financial services regulator for 
the state of Michigan challenged the ability of a mortgage company sub-
sidiary of a national bank to escape state regulation.130  The state regulator 
argued that because the mortgage company, Wachovia Mortgage, was not 
itself a national bank but only the subsidiary of a national bank, Michigan’s 
laws should not be preempted.  In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court found in 
favor of the bank, stating that the preemption powers given by the National 
Banking Act covered subsidiaries of national banks as well as the banks 
themselves.131 
The policy debate between state and federal regulators over preemption 
became quite heated, with some advocates for state regulation being par-
ticularly outspoken.  Foremost among these was Elliott Spitzer, Attorney 
General for New York State.  In 2003, Spitzer threatened to sue the OCC 
over its preemption activities.132  After Spitzer initiated an investigation 
into racially discriminatory behavior by national banks in New York State, 
however, the OCC joined an industry trade group in suing him and effec-
tively prevented the investigation.133  Spitzer had perhaps a higher profile 
than other advocates for the rights of states to regulate lending, but he was 
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not alone.  Many other state regulators and attorneys general also argued 
against the federal agency’s aggressive preemption practices as well. 
During the second high risk boom in the mid-2000s, exotic mortgage 
products became more widespread in both the prime and subprime markets.  
As banks and thrifts became increasingly drawn into higher-risk markets, 
and as the performance of such products began to show some weaknesses, 
banking regulators issued some warnings about their use.  In 2003, the 
OCC issued another warning about the risks posed by subprime loans to the 
banks it regulated.  The agency was particularly concerned that national 
banks might suffer “legal, reputation and other risks” in acquiring loans 
through mortgage brokers or by purchasing loans from originators.134 
Despite their issuing warnings about the risk to lenders involved in sub-
prime lending, except for the modest changes to HOEPA in 2001, federal 
policy-makers made essentially no substantive changes in regulations 
aimed at curbing lending abuses and the growth of excessively risky lend-
ing practices in the subprime market.  In fact, federal regulators facilitated 
the expansion of high-risk lending and paved the way for the second high-
risk boom by actively preempting states’ attempts to increase lending regu-
lations when federal policy makers would not. 
In the second high risk boom, there was an increase in the use of “alter-
native” or exotic loan structures, including interest-only, negative amortiza-
tion and payment-option loans.  These structures were applied to both the 
subprime and prime markets.  Subprime loans were increasingly structured 
as hybrid adjustable rate loans in which the interest rate would be fixed for 
two or three years and then allowed to adjust.  Many prime loans were also 
structured with adjustable rates.  As different exotic features were layered 
on top of each other, many observers became increasingly worried about 
the underlying risk in the mortgage marketplace. 
In the early to mid-2000s, consumer advocates and the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office called on federal regulators to do more to regulate the af-
filiates and subsidiaries of banks that were increasingly dominating the 
subprime and high-risk loan markets.  In general, the supervision of these 
lenders was left to state financial service regulators and to the Federal 
Trade Commission, both of which lacked the level of supervisory resources 
as the federal banking regulators.  In early 2004, the General Accounting 
Office issued a report calling for stronger regulatory supervision in the 
subprime market and specifically called for giving the Federal Reserve 
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more explicit power to conduct regular examinations of lenders affiliated 
with banks through bank holding company structures.135  Earlier in 2000, 
Edward Gramlich, a Federal Reserve Board Governor, had urged Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman of the Board, to direct examiners to examine the 
lending of bank-affiliated mortgage companies on a pilot basis.136  The 
suggestion was rebuffed by Chairman Greenspan.137 
More generally, even though federal regulators had issued caution to 
banks holding subprime loans directly on their balance sheets, they gener-
ally supported the growth of the subprime mortgage market.  The most im-
portant support came in the form of the preemption of state consumer pro-
tection laws, but key federal regulators also issued statements and studies 
that argued that subprime lending was providing increased homeownership 
among minority and lower-income groups, which in turn gave support to 
similar arguments made by industry lobbyists working against efforts in 
Congress to increase regulation.  The evidence presented for these claims, 
however, was quite limited, and there was little analysis of the benefits and 
costs associated with subprime lending or even whether subprime-financed 
homeownership was economically beneficial to borrowers. 
In July of 2003, the OCC released a controversial working paper enti-
tled, “Economic Issues in Predatory Lending,” during the agency’s deci-
sion-making process over its first preemptions of state consumer protection 
laws.138  The OCC study argued that state anti-predatory lending laws re-
duced levels of subprime lending and suggested that this was a negative 
outcome because it reduced “credit availability.”  It now looks quite likely 
that subprime markets were, in fact, providing socially inefficient amounts 
and types of credit.  The OCC report relied primarily on a study by the in-
dustry-funded Credit Research Center at Georgetown University, which 
found that the number of subprime originations in North Carolina had de-
clined by approximately 14% as a result of the state passing the first anti-
predatory lending law.  The OCC paper suggested that this was an undesir-
able effect of the law.  Many would now likely question, however, whether 
a decline in subprime lending of 14% was an undesirable result.  By re-
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stricting abusive practices and reducing the number of loans with excessive 
upfront fees, such laws are likely to discourage the riskiest loans. 
The OCC was not alone in its support for the booming subprime indus-
try.  Federal Reserve Governor Gramlich gave a speech in 2004 that, while 
acknowledging the problems of higher foreclosure rates in the subprime 
market, clearly viewed higher levels of subprime lending as a positive 
trend:  “Despite the caveats, the net social evaluation of these trends is 
probably a strong positive.”139  Only three years later, Gramlich seemed 
much less certain on this count.140  Gramlich had also argued in 2004 that 
“subprime lending represents a natural evolution of credit markets.”141  
Gramlich was clearly not alone in this opinion, especially among econo-
mists at the federal regulatory agencies.  Subprime lending was often 
viewed as generally an organic, natural outgrowth of technological and fi-
nancial innovation that was somehow purely the product of unfettered free 
markets.  Yet the history of deregulation and supportive policies supporting 
structured mortgage finance suggests otherwise.  Housing finance markets 
are politically and socially constructed.  They are the products of decades 
of lobbying and policy debates at the state and federal levels. 
In late 2005, as the market for exotic loans boomed and increasingly in-
volved both prime and subprime loans, the four banking regulators issued 
proposed guidance on “nontraditional” mortgage products—what many 
called exotic loans—and issued final guidance in October of 2006.142  Re-
sponding to the late 2005 proposal, consumer groups warned that regulators 
were not going nearly far enough.  In particular, they argued that regulators 
should direct lenders to underwrite adjustable rate loans using the maxi-
mum interest rate to which a loan might adjust.  In fact, many subprime and 
other adjustable rate loans were approved based on initial, low fixed intro-
ductory or “teaser” interest rates that later could adjust upwards a great 
deal.  Advocates also generally called for the essential prohibition of no-
documentation or stated-income loans, while regulators merely discouraged 
the use of such products.  Of course, the guidance was inherently limited in 
 
 139. Edward M. Gramlich, Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Subprime Mortgage 
Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges, Speech before the Financial Services Roundtable 
Annual Housing Policy Meeting (May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Gramlich, Subprime], avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm. 
 140. Edward M. Gramlich, Senior Fellow, Urban Inst., Booms and Busts:  The Case of 
Subprime Mortgages, Address in Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411542_Gramlich_final.pdf. 
 141. See Gramlich, Subprime, supra note 139. 
 142. U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY GUID-
ANCE ON NONTRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCT RISKS (2006), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20060929a1.pdf. 
IMMERGLUCK_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:54:04 PM 
2009] PRIVATE RISK, PUBLIC RISK 485 
its impact on the mortgage market, because it applied only to depository 
institutions directly regulated by the four regulators and not to the many af-
filiate and independent mortgage companies that were, on average, more 
active in the subprime and high-risk markets. 
In 2006 and early 2007, as problems in subprime and higher risk market 
segments became much clearer and caused significant disruptions to 
broader financial markets, regulators responded with additional proposals 
and hearings.  The Federal Reserve Board held hearings related to sub-
prime and predatory lending in both 2006 and 2007 and, in early 2007, is-
sued a draft proposal for increased regulation of the subprime market.  Af-
ter the 2007 hearings, the Board issued a more complete set of regulatory 
proposals with particular attention to using HOEPA to regulate a substan-
tially broader segment of the subprime market, rather than just the very 
high-cost segment that HOEPA had been used to address previously. 
After the fall 2006 election, when Democrats gained control of the 
House of Representatives and Barney Frank (D-MA) took over as chair of 
the House Financial Services Committee, there was also some movement in 
the legislative arena.  Frank sponsored a bill that contained many substan-
tive regulations that consumer advocates had been proposing for over a 
decade.  The bill that eventually passed the House in 2007, however, also 
contained some key language that would preempt some state efforts to im-
pose assignee liability in a stronger way than the federal law would.  De-
spite the fact that the 2007–2008 subprime crisis had been caused in large 
part by breakdowns in the mortgage supply chain—which is precisely what 
assignee liability is designed to guard against—industry lobbyists had once 
again successfully weakened the law in this regard. 
Of course, by late 2007, a good deal of the damage done by high-risk 
lending had already been put in motion and the subprime market had been 
substantially shut down.  Therefore, proposals to increase regulation would 
be relevant in the longer term to prevent a repeat of mortgage market ex-
cesses and abuses.  Many of the proposals both in the Frank bill and in the 
proposed HOEPA regulations would constitute significant regulatory im-
provements and help set the stage for sounder lending markets going for-
ward. 
CONCLUSION 
The risks and costs of poorly regulated, high-risk lending markets had 
become clear during an earlier, but somewhat smaller, boom in high-risk 
lending in the middle to late 1990s.  For a variety of reasons, some of 
which are beyond the scope of this Article, the knowledge of the problems 
and costs of high-risk lending had minimal impact on policy making.  
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While regulators and legislators in office during the more recent 2002–
2007 high-risk lending boom could have done much more to reduce the 
eventual fallout, the seeds of the fundamentally flawed market structures 
and regulatory systems that allowed the crisis to develop had been sowed 
much earlier. 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a deliberate movement, aggres-
sively promoted by the financial services sector, by some in Congress, fed-
eral regulatory agencies, to reduce the public sector oversight of the finan-
cial services sector.  The proponents of deregulation—and of adapting 
regulations or supervision to emerging market segments—have argued that 
reducing the regulatory restrictions on the financial system unleashes free 
market efficiencies.  In their perspective, less government involvement is 
almost always seen as a superior model for any form of exchange of goods 
or services. 
In the arena of financial services regulation, the shift over the last thirty 
years toward increasingly deregulationist policies has been at least as po-
litical as any other phase in U.S. history.  Some argue that the successes of 
deregulationist advocates have been related, both as a cause and a result, to 
the increasing concentration of wealth in the United States.  In a vicious 
cycle, financial services providers are served well by deregulation and are 
then able to push for even more deregulation. 
Lobbying by the financial industry, however, has not been the only fac-
tor supporting deregulation.  Public policies are shaped by more than a 
simple competition of special interests; they are shaped by the competition 
of ideas.143  Clearly, both interests and ideology have been important in 
shaping policy in this arena.  Campaign finance and the dominance of cor-
porate lobbyists have clearly been important in continuing movement to-
ward the deregulation of mortgage and consumer finance.  Deregulationist, 
free-market ideology has been accepted, however, even by many who do 
not have clear financial interests in an unregulated financial system.  By the 
late twentieth century, many policy-makers had developed priorities that 
include strong anti-regulatory postures.  Regulation often became viewed 
as inherently ineffective or counterproductive. 
One effect of the recent devotion to free markets, however, has been to 
conceal the highly political nature of banking and credit markets.  It has 
served to mask the extent to which market developments in mortgage fi-
nance were derived from a long history of government action and involve-
ment.  To hear some analysts describe financial developments, one might 
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gather that private entrepreneurs and lenders developed most of the suc-
cessful innovations and developments in consumer finance and mortgage 
markets, while public sector involvement had only been counterproductive.  
In fact, government actors created, subsidized, and institutionalized many 
of the most successful, sustainable, and risk-limiting mortgage products 
and practices since the early part of the twentieth century.  This includes 
the long-term fully amortizing mortgage, private mortgage insurance (espe-
cially in its recent forms), and all sorts of standardization and discipline 
that enhanced the stability of the financial services industry and served to 
limit foreclosure risk in mortgage markets.  Meanwhile, many private sec-
tor innovations, such as highly structured and multiple-order securitiza-
tions, stated-income and piggy-back loans, and others, have proven to be 
abject failures. 
Of course, public policy has aided and abetted some harmful develop-
ments as well as positive ones and, specifically, had a significant role in 
paving the way for a fundamentally flawed system of structured mortgage 
finance that was the principal driver of the 2007–2008 crisis.  But the prin-
cipal policy approach that encouraged and enabled the boom-bust problems 
of recent decades was comprised largely of deregulation and the preemp-
tion of states’ efforts to regulate when they felt federal regulation lacking. 
It has become painfully obvious that mortgage markets are not well 
served by a deregulationist paradigm.  Periods of stability and incremental 
progress towards access to affordable and sound credit and capital have in-
volved a strong, proactive role for the public sector, both in terms of pro-
viding and standardizing risk-limiting mortgage products and in terms of 
providing a regulatory infrastructure that constrains market booms and 
busts. 
The flood of high-risk credit after 2002 was fundamentally enabled by a 
strong, deregulationist push on the part of the financial services industry, as 
well as many federal policy-makers, to avoid or eviscerate state and federal 
regulation and constraints that had resulted in a robust, but risk-limiting, 
mortgage finance system.  Especially since the 1980s, deregulationist 
forces typically dominated the development of consumer and mortgage fi-
nance policy.  These policies paved the way for the connection of unre-
strained global capital markets to create investment structures designed 
primarily to speed the flow of high-cost and high-risk credit to local com-
munities, and especially to communities most vulnerable to such costs and 
risks. 
The market structures that developed under a very weak regime of gov-
ernment oversight and regulation—although sometimes with specific tax 
and legal advantages—ignored the very powerful negative spillovers of ex-
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cessively risky and irresponsible lending.  The result was that mortgage 
lending was not treated much differently than markets for most mass-
marketed consumer products.  There was little thought given to the funda-
mentally distinct nature of real estate and housing, or to the impacts of 
foreclosure on households’ long-term economic prospects and on 
neighborhoods and cities. 
